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WHAT'S HAPPENING WITH RESPECT TO THE
SECOND CIRCUIT
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
Good morning. It is time to start the substantive portion of the
program which deals with the Supreme Court's decisions of last
Term. Our scope, of course, is much broader than simply cases
involving state and local government. We deal with a breadth of
cases ranging from the First Amendment to various federal statutes
to matters at the state and local government end.
It is our tradition here to commence with a discussion of the
Civil Rights Law of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which has achieved
great prominence in litigation, particularly in establishing
constitutional rights and rights under federal law.
To preside over that aspect of the program, we are honored to be
able to present to you a full-time professor at this law school, one
of America's very distinguished judges of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit. I am always proud to be able to
introduce Judge Pratt because he and I share a background as
municipal lawyers. I think those of you here who are also
municipal lawyers should appreciate that as well.
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He is not only a graduate of Yale Law School and a former clerk
to Judge Charles W. Froessel of the New York State Court of
Appeals, but he was also special counsel to the Board of
Supervisors of Nassau County and special counsel to many of the
villages. Until the time he ascended to the federal district court, he
was a municipal law practitioner. It is my pleasure to now
introduce to you, for the purpose of discussing the overall picture
with section 1983 and a particular picture relative to the Second
Circuit, the Honorable George C. Pratt.
Hon. George C. Pratt*:
Thank you, Leon, and good morning. This symposium, of
course, is about the Supreme Court and its relationship to local
government. For most of the day that is what you are going to hear
about. However, I have been designated moderator for this
morning and that means I am supposed to say something here at
the beginning. I hope you will forgive me if I choose to talk a little
bit about my own court, the Second Circuit.
Like the symposium last year, you might entitle my comments
here: What's Happening with Respect to the Second Circuit. What
the Supreme Court does is significant, but only to the extent that
lower courts, lawyers, and citizens respond to what they do.
Therefore, taking a look at how other people interpret the work of
the Supreme Court is as significant, perhaps even more significant
in a practical sense, than what the Supreme Court itself does. That
is simply because what we do is supposed to reflect the results of
what the Supreme Court has done. Thus, what the Second Circuit
has done this past year is, generally speaking, we hope, a reflection
of what the Supreme Court was at work doing in prior years.
Last year, I told this assembly three things about the Second
Circuit's work. First, the two largest groups of section 19831 cases
* The Honorable George C. Pratt is a full-time Professor of Law at Touro

College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. Judge Pratt was appointed to the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York in 1976 and
served there until 1982, when he was appointed to the Second Circuit of the
United States Court of Appeals.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). This section provides in pertinent part:
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we heard involved qualified immunity 2 and municipal liability.3

Secondly, the most frequent substantive claim to be asserted in our
court was a claim for retaliation. 4 And thirdly, I directed and
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shAll be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
2. See, e.g., Frank v. Relin, 1 F.3d 1317 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
604 (1993) (vacating and remanding grant of summary judgment in favor of
district attorney in a civil rights suit brought by a non-lawyer employee of the
district attorney's office as qualified immunity was not a proper defense to an
official capacity claim); Calhoun v. New York State Div. of Parole Officers, 999
F.2d 647, 655 (2d Cir. 1993) (granting prison officials qualified immunity since
at the time of the incident "it was not clearly established.., that imposing a
short period of 'delinquency time' without providing a final parole-revocation
hearing would violate due process"); Mozzochi v. Borden, 959 F.2d 1174 (2d
Cir. 1992) (holding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from
suit under § 1983 as the plaintiff's criminal arrest and subsequent prosecution
was supported by probable cause).
3. See, e.g., Hertz Corp. v. City of N.Y., 1 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1054 (1994) (asserting that a declaratory judgment
invalidating a city law which based motor vehicle rental fees and decisions on
residence should be granted); Dwares v. City of N.Y., 985 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.
1993) (stating that § 1983 complaint alleging that officers conspired with
skinheads to allow the skinheads to assault flag burners did not sufficiently set
forth facts to establish that there was a municipal custom or policy that had
contributed to plaintiffs injuries).
4. See, e.g., Termite Control Corp. v. Horowitz, 28 F.3d 1335 (2d Cir.
1994) (asserting both RICO and civil rights claims against Board of Education
and various inspectors for canceling maintenance and repair contracts after
plaintiff revealed kickback scheme that ostensibly violated plaintiff's
constitutional rights); Sands v. Runyon, 28 F.3d 1323, 1331 (2d Cir. 1994)
(affirming denial of relief of expungement of negative information from
plaintiffs personnel file as plaintiff "failed to present specific evidence of
'purposeful retaliation.., while on the job which caused him to be harmed,'
and therefore no justification existed to even review the personnel file");
Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1612 (1994) (holding that evidence was insufficient to establish a claim of
retaliation where the basis for the claim was several informal complaints
alleging unequal pay and sexual discrimination made to a supervisor);
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invited the audience's attention to the problem created by the
Supreme Court case of Siegert v. Gilley,5 which held that the
proper way for a circuit court to approach a qualified immunity
appeal is to first determine whether there had been a violation of a
constitutional right. Only then may the court move on and address
the issue of immunity.6 I suggested at that time that this approach
threatened to create an end run around the federal-court principle
7
of finality, which requires a final judgment for federal appeals.
The way to get interlocutory review of the denial of a motion to
dismiss is by later moving to dismiss on qualified immunity
grounds. An order denying that motion has been held to be
appealable. On the appeal, under Siegert, you can get the
constitutional question reviewed as well as the immunity question.
The Supreme Court says, first you have to review whether or not
the complaint alleges a violation of a constitutional right. It seems
to me that this might create an undermining of the integrity of the
final judgment rule in the court. I felt this was an important
development from last year, so I thought I would bring it to your
attention.
Now, let me report to you about those statements. As to number
one, it is still half true, because it is based on what happened
roughly last June, 1993, through June, 1994.
Qualified immunity is still an issue in a large group of the
appeals that come before our court. 8 Municipal liability is an issue;
Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 1993), cert
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1189 (1994) (affirming district court's finding that plaintiff

met her burden of proving that she was discharged in retaliation for complaints
she made alleging sexual harassment by her supervisor).
5. 500 U.S. 226 (1991).
6. Id. at 231.
7. George C. Pratt, What's Happening with Respect to the Second Circuit,
10 TOURO L. REv. 297, 302 (1994).
8. See cases cited supra note 2; see also Goldberg v. Town of Rocky Hill,
973 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that there is no immunity available to a
municipality sought to be held liable under § 1983 in ,in action brought by a
former police officer claiming that the elimination of his position was in
retaliation for his having supported the chief of police on a controversial issue);
DiMarco v. Rome Hosp., 952 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that order
denying summary judgment was not appealable in a civil rights action brought
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however, it generally boils down to a question of whether or not
there is a municipal policy, and the volume of cases presenting that

issue has just fallen way off.
As for number two, the issue of retaliation is still a relatively
frequent claim in our court. 9 More than that, the claim seems to be
gaining more respect. That is, the judges are becoming more
familiar and more comfortable with the whole idea of retaliation
claims. In a surprising number of cases, that is, surprising to me, it
is proving to be a successful claim. 10 It seems to be one that
appeals particularly to juries.11
As for number three, the business of Siegert v. Gilley, the end
run I predicted simply has not happened yet. Whether it will or not,
I do not know. In some cases, it seems that my colleagues have

against hospital officials and the hospital by the plaintiff who claimed that they
retaliated against him for his exercise of free speech).
9. See Gagliardi v. Village of Pawling, 18 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. 1994)
(claiming that town refused to enforce zoning regulations in retaliation for a
complaint plaintiff-homeowner made against neighbor); Cosgrove v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 9 F.3d 1033 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that a female employee
made a prima facie showing that she was fired because she filed a sexual
harassment complaint with the EEOC against her employer).
10. See Gagliardi, 18 F.3d 188 (reversing dismissal of retaliation claim
where plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to allow an inference that
defendant's acts were motivated by plaintiff's exercise of free speech rights);
Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 73 (1994)
(vacating dismissal of plaintiffs claim for retaliation finding that district court
made inappropriate factual determinations in holding that plaintiff failed to state
a First Amendment violation); Piesco v. Koch, 12 F.3d 332 (2d Cir. 1993)
(precluding summary judgment where plaintiff's testimony before legislative
committee was an exercise of free speech as a determination of summary
judgment necessarily includes drawing factual inferences and weighing the
credibility of parties).
f 1. See Malarkey v. Texaco, Inc., 983 F.2d 1204 (2d Cir. 1993) (affirming
finding by jury that defendant engaged in retaliatory discrimination as well as
district court's doubling of the jury award of $65,000 to S130,000); DunlapMcCuller v. Riese Org., 980 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1992), cerl. denied, 114 S. Ct.
290 (1993) (increasing on appeal a jury award of $1,500 by $5,720 as verdict
for retaliation was inadequate).
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ignored Siegert v. Gilley and addressed qualified immunity without
ever having addressed the alleged constitutional violation. 12
In those cases, the allegation of a constitutional violation was
apparent. Thus, it did not warrant discussion. So far, I think there
was only one case in our circuit where we said, wait a minute, this
is a qualified immunity appeal, but we are not going to reach that
issue. We are going to reverse the district court because there was
not even a proper allegation of a constitutional right. 13 So much
for last year and what happened.
As you know, section 1983 is the device by which municipal
governmental decisions get reviewed for their constitutionality.
Section 1983 is essentially what we are talking about when we
have a Supreme Court conference about municipal government.
You get into federal court through section 1983.
Let us take a closer look at the Second Circuit's work on section
1983 this past year, looking at the reported opinions of the court,
roughly for the period, as I said, June 1993 to June 1994. Overall,
in this past year, the Second Circuit wrote fifty opinions involving
section 1983 cases. This represents the work output of
approximately two judges of the court, nearly ten percent of our
work capacity. To interpolate that further, we write opinions in
roughly one-third of the cases that we decide. Two-thirds of the
cases get disposed of by summary order. Those are cases that do
not represent any new issues that are worthy of opinions in the

12. See, e.g., Moore v. Comesanas, 32 F.3d 670 (2d Cir. 1994) (vacating as
moot the district court's grant of qualified immunity while reversing that portion
of the judgment that set aside the jury's verdict as a matter of law); O'Neill v.
Town of Babylon, 986 F.2d 646, 649 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that a police officer
will receive qualified immunity from an unlawful arrest suit if "it was
objectively reasonable for him to believe his actions were lawful"). But see
Velardi v. Walsh, 40 F.3d 569 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming the district court's grant
of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity after addressing the
constitutionality of the procurement of two search warrants and the execution of
one of them).
13. See Knipe v. Skinner, 19 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1994) (concluding that the
government had grounds for Rule II sanctions against the plaintiff because
plaintiff "offer[ed] no authority demonstrating that [government]'s alleged
conduct would violate any clearly established constitutional right").
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views of the judges, and which result in affirmances, since we do
not reverse by summary, order.
To interpolate about fifty opinions, figure you can assume that
we have about 150 cases under section 1983 that were calendared,
scheduled, and decided. We receive roughly 1,500 cases in all
areas of the law. Therefore, about ten percent of the work of the
Second Circuit deals with section 1983.
What kinds of cases do we have in terms of subject matter? The
largest group by far this past year was public employment eases,
which totaled approximately thirty-four percent or seventeen out of
fifty cases. Some were discharge cases, some dealt with a denial of
promotion, some involved a claim of sexual harassment, and some
were disciplinary claims. These cases arose out of the fact that the
government employs people and under section 1983, potential
constitutional rights are thus involved.
Twenty-two percent of the cases, approximately eleven of them,
arose in the prison context. Most of these were challenges, to some
extent, to the prison disciplinary hearing process, which is
undergoing an intensive examination at the present time. This is
not a problem that generally affects municipal government,
however, it is one that largely concerns the state attorney general.
Due process problems are being generated from the manner in
which the state handles disciplinary problems within the prisons.
Some of the prison cases involved claims of excess force where
guards were either too rough or did not prevent another prisoner
from getting too rough with the plaintiff.
Seven of the cases are what I think of as the typical police-type
case involving false arrest, malicious prosecution, or excessive
force. Five cases, about ten percent of the total, involved property
claims of one sort or another, whether it be land use planning,
zoning, or claims for public benefits.
At least one case involved an interesting claim that the city of
New York was holding up payments to a contractor, in part for
retaliation, 14 because the contractor had talked to the press about

14. Termite Control Corp. v. Horowitz, 28 F.3d 1335 (2d Cir. 1994).
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the kickbacks he had to make to the school inspectors. 15 This type
of claim is being asserted with increasing frequency around the
country, but that is the only one I could find in the Second Circuit
itself. Two of the cases represented federal statutory rights as
opposed to constitutional rights, and there are miscellaneous other
kinds of cases.
Within that subject matter context, about fifteen of the fifty
opinions involve -the issue of qualified immunity. Five of them
were retaliation-type claims where the claimant was saying, "I did
something that was constitutionally protected, and in turn, you
deprived me of some benefit or inflicted some kind of punishment
on me." Most of those involved the employment context, but not
all of them. Some of them came up in the police context. There
were a couple of cases that involved res judicata issues, largely
arising out of prior decisions where the plaintiff was unhappy with
the result in federal court. 16 There are some tricky issues there.
That is basically a snapshot of the kind of work that our court has
done this past year.
If you look at what the Supreme Court did this past year, the
parallels are remarkable. They have one case each evolving out of
the employment, property, statutory rights, and a police situation.
They had two cases involving prisoner-type claims with respect to
the recurring issues. There is one opinion on retaliation 17 and
15. For a recitation of the relevant facts, see the Eastern District of New
York's decision in Nu-Life Constr. Corp. v. Board of Educ., 809 F. Supp. 171
(E.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd in part and vacated in part sub nom. Termite Control
Corp. v. Horowitz, 28 F.3d 1335 (2d Cir. 1994).

16. See Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 1994). In this case,
plaintiff, an inmate at Rikers Island, instituted a § 1983 action against certain
prison employees after being attacked by another inmate. Id. at 788. The district
court dismissed the action on summary judgment, stating that the claim was
barred by res judicata in that the same claim was decided in a prior state court
habeas corpus action. Id at 789. However, the Second Circuit reversed the
decision and remanded the case back to the district court, stating that the action

was not barred, as the court in the prior action had no authority to grant the
relief the plaintiff was presently requesting. Id. at 792.

17. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994). Plaintiff, a hospital nurse,
was allegedly fired for making negative comments about the obstetric
department to a nurse who was contemplating transferring into the department.
Id. at 1882. Subsequently, that nurse decided not to transfer into the department.
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another on qualified immunity. 18 Everything there, except res
judicata, is almost identical to the work that is facing our circuit
court. Obviously, there is no surprise in the kind of work that is
being done in the courts, which clearly is a reflection of what kind
of problems we have out there in life. However, in terms of the
Supreme Court, the problems that you litigants were having four
years ago were the kinds of things that this past year are filtering
up to their level. The difference between our two courts is largely a
question of timing and how this trickle-up process operates.
The Supreme Court this past year, as I said, handed down
opinions in each of these areas of law. They write opinions only in
cases where they think they want to shape, change, or massage the
law one way or another. They write, largely, for the benefit of the
lower court judges. They are very careful about picking cases that
will have some significance and utility in guiding the law. They are
not concerned with the results in a particular case, even if they
think somebody got a raw deal from the policymaking body. They
make adjustments in the law as they see fit.
What that means for our court, and for the rest of us, is that we
have a lot of re-examining to do about what we understand the law
to be. In other words, we are engaged in the continuing process of
fine tuning when, for example, the Supreme Court hands dovn a
retaliation decision. We have got to read the decision and then reexamine our thinking in light of what the Supreme Court now says
are the principles that are supposed to be applied in similar
situations. So, not only do you have a lot of thinking to do about
the types of cases that come before you in your practice, but we
judges also have to re-think the section 1983 cases we get because
the Supreme Court has, in effect, changed, clarified, or modified
the law in almost every area on which we have written in the last
year.
I have one other comment that may be of some concern to you it deals with the question of punitive damages. It seems to me that
Id Plaintiff was fired and then filed suit under § 1983, claiming that her First
Amendment freedom of speech rights were violated. Id at 1883.
18. Elder v. Holloway, 114 S. Ct. 1019 (1994) (addressing the use of
relevant legal authority and standard of judicial review of qualified immunity
claims).
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there are storms gathering all over the country dealing with the
problem of punitive damages. There are all kinds of problems that
have been raised. They have been addressed, in part, by state
legislatures. The Supreme Court has also wrestled with some
aspects of it. Constitutionally, this involves the due process
provision, the excessive fines provision, and the Eighth
Amendment. They have looked at whether there needs to be some
kind of relationship between the amount of compensatory and
punitive damages.
Nobody, however, has looked too seriously at the problem of
serial awards of punitive damages. In other words, if certain types
of outrageous conduct affects more than one person, can successive
plaintiffs each recover punitive damages for that conduct, or is the
first award, which is designed to punish the defendant for having
engaged in the conduct and to deter the defendant and others from
engaging in similar conduct, enough? Is it that they got one award
and when the second plaintiff comes along, it looks something like
double jeopardy?
The law of punitive damages is just not harmonious. There is no
consistent theory. Eventually, it will have to be straightened out,
whether it is done by Congress or by the Supreme Court. They
have experimented with caps on punitive damages and tried to
determine who should get them. Should it be the plaintiff or is it
just a windfall to the plaintiff. If part of the function is to deter,
then it sounds like a criminal-law type thing, so perhaps it should
be viewed as a fine. Should they be paid in court? I am sure the
judges would like the idea if they made some kind of a judges'
welfare fund and all punitive damages would be paid into that.
However, that would reduce the incentive for attorneys to pursue
them.
Will punitive damages be straightened out in my lifetime?
Probably not. However, I have great faith in our system.
Eventually, we will find a rational way to deal with punitive
damages. Certainly the present system is somewhat insane. Even if
it is constitutional, it is still insane.
What does all this mean? Why have I taken fifteen minutes here
to tell you a lot of statistics and what we are doing, highlighting
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details in which you probably have little interest? It is just a way of
demonstrating that section 1983, the basic subject of this
conference, is still a very dynamic area of the law that has great
significance at all levels of our system.
You people are to be congratulated in your wisdom in attending
this symposium, which is designed to keep you up with the latest
developments of the Supreme Court in this turbulent area of the
law. I hope you find the rest of the program to be informative and
rewarding.
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